Where Trespass and Assumpsit Clash by Otten, William L.
Volume 54 
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 54, 
1949-1950 
10-1-1949 
Where Trespass and Assumpsit Clash 
William L. Otten 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
William L. Otten, Where Trespass and Assumpsit Clash, 54 DICK. L. REV. 43 (1949). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol54/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
NOTES
WHERE TRESPASS AND ASSUMPSIT CLASH
The scene is a self-service market; the characters-Mrs. A and Mrs.B, house-
wives doing their shopping.
Mrs. A, among other things, selects a jar of vacuum-packed coffee which she
places in her cart. Proceeding to the aisle of the counter where payment is to be
made Mrs. A places her hand upon the jar of coffee, preparatory to lifting it from
the cart, when it explodes, injuring her hand and arm.
Meanwhile Mrs. B, being a great drinker of ginger ale, picks up two bottles
of the beverage, whereupon one of them explodes, injuring her leg severely.
Mrs. A and Mrs. B both sue the remote vendor for damages. Mrs. A recovers
a verdict of $370. Mrs. B suffers the embarrassment of a judgment for defendant
on preliminary objection.
This is precisely what happened in two recent cases. Mrs. A's recovery
occurred in Dillon v. William S. Scull Co.' decided by the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania. Mrs. B's failure to recover was decided in Loch, et ux v. Confair, et
ux 2 by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
On the surface these cases seem to be in definite conflict, but on closer ex-
amination we find one major difference between the two cases. Mrs. A brought
her action in trespass, on the basis of negligence. Mrs. B brought her suit in
assumpsit, on the basis of a breach of an implied warranty.
Now let's put ourselves in the position of Mrs. A or Mrs. B. Whom shall
we sue and on what theory?
There are four possibilities which can be readily seen:
1. Sue the immediate vendor on the theory of a breach of implied war-
ranty in assumpsit.3
2. Sue the immediate vendor in tort, theory-negligence.'
3. Sue the remote vendor (mfg'r) in assumpsit-breach of implied
warranty. 5
4. Sue the remote vendor in trespass for negligence.6
1 - Pa. Super, -, 64 A. 2d 525 (1949).
2 - Pa. -, 63 A. 2d 24 (1949).
3 Bonenberger v. Pittsburgh Mercantile Co., 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913 (1942).
4 Ebbert v. Phila. Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
5 Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburgh, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
6 Dillon v. Scull, -Pa.-, 64 A.2d 525; MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382,
iii N. E. 1050 (1916).
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All of these methods have been successful urider various factual situations. It is
our purpose here to note the difference between these various arrangements of
fact so as to know which of the above combinations will result in a favorable
decision in our particular case.
In 1842 the case of Winterbottom v. Wrighs decided that a person not a party
to a contract did not have a cause of action for damages resulting therefrom.1 The
decision went no farther than the contract itself; however, it was universally con-
strued to mean that there could be no action, even in tort, for injuries resulting
from the contract by a person not a party to the contract. 8 This then is the basis
of the often quoted rule that the manufacturer or supplier of chattels is not liable
for defects in manufacture, and harm resulting therefrom, to any person not a
party to the contract.9
It did not take the courts long to realize the impropriety of this rule, and
exceptions soon arose. Notable among these was the case of Thomas v. Winchester
which in 1852 laid down the rule that the supplier of drugs and medicines is
liable to persons though no contractual relation existed between the manufacturer
and the person injured. 10
Judge Cardozo was given the opportunity to set the law on the subject in
1916, when he decided the leading case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. 1 He
said that the manufacturer of chattels is liable to a person not a party to the con-
tract for injuries resulting from defects in the manufacture of such chattels. This
rule is not limited to things which in their normal operation are implements of
destruction, but extends to any article whose nature is such that negligent manu-
facture will place persons in peril.' 2 In addition to this, the decision creates a duty
on the part of the manufacturer to inspect his products, which duty is independent
of contract.
The next step for imposing liability upon the remote seller of chattels was
to create a strict liability based upon an implied warranty.1 3 From this point there
seems to be confusion and dilemma, the ultimate result of which is the emanation
of the two cases forming the hypo, those of Mrs. A and Mrs. B.
(1) Suit Against the Immediate Vendor in Assumpsit For Breach of Implied
Warranty
The first case of this type in Pennsylvania was decided in 1942, Bonenberger
v. Pittsburgh Merchantile Co.14 It was said in this case that as between the seller
7 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842).
8 PROSSER, TORTS 183, p. 674.
9 Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 61 L.R.A. 303 (1903).
10 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455 (1852).
11 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
12 RESTATEMENT, TORTS 2 395.
13 PROSSER, TORTS 1 83, p. 689.
14 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913 (1942).
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and the consumer of food-stuffs there is an implied warranty that the food is
fit for human consumption. The court said that an implied warranty exists in the
case of food sold in the original container, under Sec. 15(1) of the Sales Act.15
The seller's obligation rests not upon negligence, but upon warranty. There-
fore the trespass cases cited are of little value.
The cause of the damage in this case was a piece of shell in a can of oysters,
which piece of shell the plaintiff unfortunately swallowed. We should note that
the food was inclosed, and thus there was no opportunity for the seller to discover
the danger by an inspection. There was no duty upon the seller of any type, and
consequently there could be no breach of a non-existent duty through negligence.
The plaintiff thereupon looked to another form of action. There was a contract
between plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff had relied upon the skill and
recommendation of the seller in selecting this brand of oysters. Upon these facts
there was an implied warranty under Sec. 15 of the Sales Act that the food was
fit for human consumption. The warranty being breached, the defendant was liable
for all injuries suffered by plaintiff as a result of the breach, and it should be
noted that the measure of damages for the personal injury was the same as if the
action had been brought in trespass.
It should also be noted that the court distinguished this case as one founded
upon contract and therefore refused to accept the rulings of cases founded upon
negligence which were presented by counsel.
Prior to this case there was one which came up in the Superior Court in
191316 against the immediate vendor, predicated upon breach of warranty. No
recovery was allowed in this case because of an insufficiency of evidence submitted
by the plaintiff. However the court did not say that assumpsit was the wrong form
of action, but left the question to a later date.
Another case decided in 1942 in the Superior Court17 throws some light
on the question. The local dealer had installed a heating system in the plaintiff's
house pursuant to a contract. The job was negligently done and resulted in con-
siderable injury to the house. The action was brought in assumpsit, and the court
said this was proper although it sounded in tort. Citing Sec. 330, Restatement of
Contracts, they said that the damages were sustained as the natural, foreseeable
result of the breach of the contract through negligence. The amount of the dam-
ages were left for the jury to determine, so long as the injured party was fully
compensated for the loss directly resulting from the breach.
16 Act of 1915, PL 543, 69 PS 124. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that
the buyer relies on the seller's skill and judgment (whether he is the grower or manufactuter or
not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
16 McSorely v. Katz, 53 Pa. Super. 243 (1913).
17 Siegel v. Struble Brothers, 150 Pa. Super 343, 28 A. 2d 352 (1942).
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The important points in this case are: first, there was a contract; second, it
was breached; third, damages resulted which should have been reasonably foreseen
at the time of making the contract to be the natural result if the contract were
not carried out according to its terms, i.e., without negligence.
The court admitted that the real issue, though it might have been brought
in trespass, was whether the dealer was guilty of negligence in the performance of
his contract.
Thib camc thcn rcpreents the borderline situation in which either trespass
or assumpsit could be chosen as the form of action, because there has been both a
contract which has been wrongfully breached, and injury wrongfully inflicted as
the result of negligence. In either form the amount of damages recovered would
be the same.
The case of Jones v. Boggs and Buhl18 did not present such a well-defined
choice. Plaintiff purchased a fur coat, the collar of which caused a skin disease.
The action was brought in assumpsit (claiming a breach of warranty) for the
purpose of evading a two year statute of limitation' 9-- "upon any action brought
to recover damages for injury to the person." The court held that the statute ap-
plied to the cause of action rather than to the form which the action ultimately
took. They intimated that had the action been brought within the two year period,
assumpsit would have been a proper form of action and recovery would have been
allowed in accordance with Sec. 69(6) of the Sales Act2 -(the measure of dam-
ages for breach of warranty is the loss directly and naturally resulting from the
breach of warranty). They further cite the Bonenberger case as authority for the
proposition that assumpsit is the proper form of action to recover for the negligent
breach of a warranty which results in personal injury.
(2) Suit Against the Immediate Vendor in Trespass For Injury Resulting From
Negligence
The previous cases illustrate the modern trend toward making the obligation
of a warrantor contractual in nature. However, the action upon a warranty was in
its origin a pure tort.2 ' The idea was that the warranty created a duty, and a
negligent breach of this duty was a tort. Therefore it is only natural that suits
should be brought in trespass for a negligent breach of warranty.
The famous Ebbert case 22 seems to be the landmark and final word on this
phase of the problem. The facts very briefly are these: the dealer expressly war-
ranted a washing machine, more particularly the safety device on the wringer. In
18 355 Pa. 242, 49 A. 2d 379 (1946).
19 Act of 1895, PL 236, § 2.
20 Act of 1915, PL 543.
21 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 197, p. 373.
22 Ebbert v. hila. Electric Co., 330 Pa. 257, 198 A. 323 (1938).
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the course of use, plaintiff had occasion to use this safety device, which failed to
release the wringer of the washer, and caused injury to the plaintiff by reason of
her hand and arm being caught in the wringer.The court said, "An action in tres-
pass may be maintained for the breach of a warranty contained in a written con-
tract of sale, and damages for personal injuries may be recovered as consequential
damages."
In analyzing this case it must be remembered that the court relied consider-
ably upon the MacPherson v. Buick case,2 8 to be discussed later; both cases are con-
cerned with enforcing public policy. The characteristic of cases in this- category
is that a chattel is involved which, if made negligently, or negligently inspected,
will be dangerous, causing harm to the public. To alleviate this danger to the
public, if the immediate vendor assumes through contract the duty of inspecting
such goods, and this inspection is negligently made, and the chattel thereby
becomes dangerous to the public, the dealer will be held liable for the damage
due to his negligence. The question of bringing this action in assumpsit does not
appear to have been considered. In keeping with the modern trend there seems
to be no reason why it could not be brought in assumpsit, should a similar case
arise today. There was a contract (privity); the warranty was breached; injury
resulted which could reasonably have been foreseen by the dealer in event of a
breach of his contract. The action however, was in trespass. In basing the cause
of action upon the negligence of the dealer the following must be remembered:
(1) there was a duty, (2) the duty was breached through negligence, and (3)
this negligence in performing the duty resulted in harm.
In this case the duty was created by a contract. However, the fundamental dis-
tinction between the tort and contract action is seen here. In the former, a duty
has been performed negligently. In the latter, a contract has been performed negli-
gently. In the latter, privity is essential; in the former, there need be no privity
between the parties. Ordinarily, the duty breached is created by lIw. However in
this instance the duty was voluntarily assumed by contract. The statement by the
court that an action in trespass may be maintained for the breach of a warranty
contained in a written contract of sale seems to be technically accurate, under the
original construction that a breach of warranty was a pure tort. However the
breach of warranty under the modern construction could provide a cause of action
in assumpsit, and damages for personal injuries could be collected as consequential
damages. The Ebbert case exemplifies the situation where a duty was created in
law because of public policy, as a result of the dealer's having voluntarily assumed
it.
It is my conclusion that this case presents an equality of choice as to which
form of action will be used. However, the case applies to an express warranty,
28 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916).
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and if a case involved merely an implied warranty the courts might create a duty
in law upon the immediate vendor less readily. There is little doubt that in the
light of the cases discussed in the first section, an action in assumpsit for the breach
of an implied warranty would cause fewer headaches.
A very definite limitation called "The Original Package Doctrine", has also
been placed upon the right to sue the immediate vendor. The idea, as stated in
West v. Emanuel,24 was to the effect that the immediate vendor would not be liable
to the consumer for the negligence of the original manufacturer or packer where
drugs are sold in the original package. This rule was subsequently enlarged to in-
clude all types of goods sold in the original package and is as stated in Kratz v.
American Stores Co., 26 that the retail vendor of goods resold by him in the original
sealed package, labelled with proper warnings and directions, is not liable for in-
juries caused by latent defects in the article except ( 1 ) in the presence of special cir-
cumstances and (2) food for human consumption. The reason for the rule evidently
is that the retailer has no opportunity to inspect the goods, or to prevent any injury
which might ensue. The exceptions seem to have been engrafted upon the rule
by the Bonenberger case 26 where, under the Sales Act, an implied warranty is
created because of the consumer's reliance upon the skill of the seller in selecting
the brand to be used, and which by that case is limited to food sold for human
consumption and drugs. Special circumstances would exist if the vendor sold the
goods in the original package as his own, or if he knew, or had reason to know,
that they were defective.
2 7
For our purposes, whenever goods are sold in the original package, the
following distinction should be made. If the subject matter is foodstuffs, it falls
within the exception and the Original Package Doctrine does not apply, and thus
an action against the immediate vendor would succeed. If the subject matter is
not food, then the doctrine would apply, and there would be no duty upon the re-
tailer for this reason, and a trespass action would fail. An assumpsit action would
fail also if the above exceptions were strictly adhered to, although there seems to be
no reason why the doctrine of the Bonenberger case could not be extended to
other cases where an implied warranty existed under Sec. 15 of the Sales Act. The
difficulty can be resolved, however, by bringing suit against the remote vendor.
(3) Suit Against the Remote Vendor in Assumpsit Based Upon Breach of an
Implied Warranty
Of the four categories being considered, this seems to be the cause for the
major portion of the confusion which is found, and is in my opinion directly
responsible for the difficulty occurring in the Loch' case.28 It is submitted that
24 198 Pa. 180, 47 A. 965 (1901).
26 359 Pa. 326, 59 A. 2d 93 (1948).
26 345 Pa. 559, 28 A. 2d 913 (1942).
27 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 399-402.
28 See note 2, Supra.
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there is no sound basis in the law for the existence of any such theory (that the
remote vendor may be sued in assumpsit for breach of implied warranty in the
absence of a contract.)
The advent of this doctrine in Pennsylvania occurred in 1931, with the
decision in Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.2 9 It is implied in this case that an action
in assumpsit will lie against the remote vendor of foods sold in the original pack-
age for breach of warranty. In view of the fact that privity has been generally
considered as an essential element for bringing suit upon a contract,3 0 it appears
that this statement could not be more wrong.
The facts of the case are these. Plaintiff purchased a bottle of Coke from a
retailer. The bottle, strangely enough, contained not only Coca Cola, but also a
bug. Naturally sickness ensued. Suit was brought against the remote supplier in
assumpsit. There was a trial on the merits. Defendant then appealed, and raised,
inter alia, the objection that the suit was brought in the wrong form of action.
The court in considering this question came to the conclusion that after
a trial on the merits, no defect of pleading which could have been raised by a
demurrer will be fatal to the judgment, unless such defect was fatally injurious
to the trial. This holding is perfectly consistent with procedure in Pennsylvania
as it now exists. An objection to the form of action will be considered if it is
timely, but the right to take advantage of the improper form of action may be
waived by defendant.81 It is too late to raise the question after a trial on the
merits,32 and unless it is shown to have injuriously affected the trial, the proper
amendment will be considered made. 83 Therefore, this case seems to be decided
on a procedural question, and correctly decides that point. The confusion enters
as a result of a misinterpretation of the holding in the case, most probably because
of the language contained in the syllabus of the report.
The case presents the duty that is imposed upon the manufacturer by law,
in that the manufacturer impliedly warrants that the goods are fit for human con-
sumption. It is the remote supplier's duty to see that food in the original package
is fit for human consumption, and a negligent breach of this duty will result in
liability to the injured persons irrespective of privity. The proper form of action,
as will be pointed out, is in trespass. There can be no action in assumpsit unless
there has been a contract, which has been breached. When a coke is purchased
from the sandwich man at a football game, the reasonable man would undoubtedly
say there was a contract between the consumer and the vendor. The man who
could dream up a contract between the consumer and the bottling company many
29 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931).
30 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1423; Sweeney v. Houston, 243 Pa. 542, 90 A. 347 (1914).
81 Welker v. Metcalf, 209 Pa. 373, 58 A. 687.
82 Williams v. Hay, 120 Pa. 485, 14 A. 379.
33 Erie City Iron Works v. Barber & Co., 102 Pa. 156 (1883).
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miles away would probably be able to solve the riddle of the fourth dimension.
However, ordinary minds must admit that there is no contract between the con-
sumer and the remote manufacturer, in the absence of an agency relationship
between the vendor and the manufacturer.
However, the law would not have become as ensnarled as it did had it not
been for the case of Bilk v. Abbotts Dairies Inc.34 in 1941. The action was brought
in assumpsit against the remote vendor. No recovery was allowed because the plain-
tiff failed to meet his burden of proof. They said that the action sounded in tort,
and therefore the provisions of the Practice Act35 governing tort actions should
apply (all other averments shall be deemed put in issue, unless expressly admit-
ted). However, citing the Nock case, the court said that plaintiff had an option
to bring his action either in trespass or assumpsit. Since there was no contract
between plaintiff and defendant, it does not seem that an action in assumpsit
would have been technically correct.
The latest case is, of course, Loch v. Confair.36 The facts have been given in
the opening hypothetical case. The fundamental distinction between this case and
the Nock case is that in the former the action did not get out of the pleading stage.
It was appealed from a judgment for defendant on a preliminary objection. This
is perfectly in accord with the rule stated above, that an objection to the form of
action will be considered, if it is timely.
The action being in assumpsit, plaintiff was put to the task of finding a
contract. An interesting question of sales was thus decided, to the effect that no
sale, or contract, was completed merely by taking the goods from the shelf of a
self-service store and placing them in a cart. Possession alone does not pass title.
Apparently the contract is complete only after the goods have been paid for, but
the court does not decide this point.
The court exercised its efforts exclusively in search of a contract between
the customer and the retail vendor, and from this it might be argued that had
there been such a contract, the requirement of privity for bringing an action in
assumpsit would have been complied with. Although the court does not say this,
it could be implied from the line of attack taken, and based upon the idea that a
warranty follows the goods. I do not think that this is a correct deduction, how-
ever, and in order to avoid further confusion it should be avoided. Where plain-
tiff sues in assumpsit upon an implied warranty of fitness, he must show privityY
s '
Privity is said to be that relationship existing between two contracting parties.
88
If two parties have never contracted with each other there could be no privity.
84 147 Pa. Super. 39, 23 A. 2d 342 (1941).
85 Act of 1915, PL 483.
86 63 A. 2d 24, - Pa.-.
37 Dillon v. Scull, 64 A. 2d 525, - Pa. Super - (1949).
88 Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1423.
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Thus, the correct rule, it would seem, is that there must be a contract between the
customer and the remote vendor, otherwise a suit in assumpsit would fail, irrespec-
tive of a contract between the customer and the retailer.
In considering the question of the form of action, the court has this to say:
"While there is a distinct tendency toward relaxation of the strictness of the com-
mon law as regards pleadings, a plaintiff cannot successfully maintain an action
in one form by averring facts establishing a valid cause of action (if) properly
brought in another form. It is immaterial that damages recoverable might be
identical." As to the Nock case, the court said, "It is unnecessary to pass upon what
was there stated." It might have been better, however, had the court cleared up the
confusion which this case has caused. This case does make one point clear-If the
plaintiff would sue in assumpsit for breach of implied warranty to recover for his
injuries, he must show a contract or sale.
The court also states that a buyer of goods injured because of unfitness of
the goods for their intended purpose may sue in assumpsit for breach of implied
warranty, or in trespass for negligence, though the measure of damages is the
same in each case. Since it has been shown that no contract existed, trespass would
have been the proper form of action.
(4) Suit Against the Remote Vendor in Trespass For Negligence
Doubt and confusion can be readily eliminated by adherence to the thought
behind the above caption. The authority for bringing the action in this form is
very strong, beginning with Cardozo's opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.39
and running to the most recent case of Dillon v. William S. Scull Co. 40 In this case
it is said that since the suit was in trespass for negligence, no privity need be
shown between the plaintiff and defendant. It is only where the plaintiff sues in
assumpsit upon an implied warranty of fitness that he must show such privity.
What must the plaintiff show in bringing an action in trespass? A duty; a
breach of that duty through negligence; resulting injury. It has been uniformly
held that the remote manufacturer is under a duty to inspect and discover any de-
fects in his product which, if not discovered, would place other persons in peril.
4'
The court in the Dillon case said, "It was the defendant's duty to use reasonable
care and by proper inspection to prevent any such matter (which would generate
gas and cause an explosion) being in the apparently inert substance which the
plaintiff purchased, viz., coffee." This duty is founded on public policy, and rests
in law, irrespective of privity. It will be found by the courts in any case where
the negligent manufacture of the product caused it to be dangerous to the public.
The primary point that must be proved is, then, the negligence of the de-
39 See note 11, Supra.
40 See note 1, Supra.
41 MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., see note 11, Supra.
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fendant. The court in the Dillon case speaks of "proof of negligence by circum-
stantial evidence," which is an application of the doctrine of exclusive control.
The court says, "Where the instrumentality is under the exclusive control of the
defendant, and it appears that in the ordinary course of experience no result fol-
lows as that complained of ... the only reasonable conclusion is that the accident
was caused by the negligence of the defendant, in the manner alleged." This is a
rule of evidence which puts the risk of non-persuasion upon the defendant. The
plaintiff must produce circumstantial evidence sufficient to take the case to the
jury. This means that he must exclude any equally well supported belief in any
inconsistent proposition or, in other words, show that under the circumstances
nothing else could have caused the accident. This does not mean that he must
eliminate every possible cause but only those that are probable, as suggested by
the evidence. If the plaintiff gets to the jury, the burden is upon the defendant to
show the exercise of due care.
There is no problem to showing the injury.
A brief review of some of the other cases in this category may serve as en-
lightening background for the conclusions reached in the Dillon case.
As has been stated, the duty upon the remote supplier of chattels to use due
care with respect to goods that might become dangerous to the public if negligently
made was laid down in the MacPherson case.
A leading case in Pennsylvania, Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca Cola
Bottling Co.,42 laid down the rule that those manufacturing or compounding foods
or beverages for human consumption must use a high degree of care to see that
they are free from foreign or deleterious substances. Even if the most up-to-date
and scientific methods are employed, the manufacturer may be liable to an injured
member of the public.
As a general rule it has been held that the seller of food is under an obliga-
tion or duty to see that the food is fit for human consumption.48 This duty has been
based both upon public policy44 and implied warranty.46
In Henderson v. Ndaional Drug Co. it was held that an action for personal
injuries against the remote packer of drugs should be ex delictu and not ex con-
tractu, and that a warranty need not be pleaded, as the duty to safeguard life and
limb does not rest upon warranty but upon a duty imposed by law.
42 296 Pa. 114, 145 A. 700 (1929).
43 Campbell v. G. C. Murphy Co., 122 Pa. Super. 342, 186 A. 269 (1936); Catani v. Swift,
251 Pa. 52, 95 A. 931 (1915) ; West v. Katsafanas, 107 Pa. Super. 118, 162 A. 685.
44 Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A. 2d 743.
45 Madden v. Great A & P Tea Co,, 106 Pa. Super. 474, 162 A. 687 (1932); Smith v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 152 Pa. Super. 445, 33 A. 2d 488 (1943).
46 Henderson v. National Drug Co., 343 Pa. 601, 23 A. 2d 743 (1942).
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In the light of this duty which is placed upon the remote suppliers of food
and other chattels which might become dangerous if negligently made, it would
seem logical that when suing the remote vendor, the correct form of action would
be trespass. Negligent performance of this duty may be proved by circumstantial
evidence as held in Dillon v. Scull, and difficulties in recovery are minimized.
It is hoped that the distinctions which have been brought forth will assist
in eliminating some of the confusion which has heretofore plagued this branch of
the law, and in furtherance of this aim the following summary of the preceding
material has been attempted.
1. A basic and fundamental rule, which may serve as a yardstick in the future
is: When suing the immediate vendor, sue in assumpsit; when suing the remote
vendor, sue in trespass. The reason for this rule is that there is generally a con-
tract with the immediate vendor, and there is no contract with the remote vendor.
2. Persons confronted with this problem should remember that a suit in as-
sumpsit must be founded upon a contract. Although this is very elementary, the
cases reviewed here demonstrate that some attorneys have overlooked this rule.
3. The distinguishing feature between trespass and assumpsit actions is that tres-
pass actions for negligence are founded upon a breach of a duty. Once again an
elementary rule.
As to the immediate vendor, if he had a duty owing to the customer he may
be sued in trespass, otherwise he may only be sued in assumpsit. In bringing as-
sumpsit it must be shown that a warranty was breached, and that the injury com-
plained of was the natural, foreseeable consequence of the breach of warranty.
The warranty may be express, or implied under Sec. 15(l) of the Sales Act.
Damages will be in accord with Sec. 69(6) of the Sales Act, and as a practical
matter will be the same as if the action had been in trespass.
If there is no warranty to be found the next quest is to find a duty imposed
upon the immediate vendor.
A duty may have been assumed by the vendor in a contract, but otherwise it
should be remembered that a duty is seldom imposed upon the immediate vendor
by law, as in the case of a remote supplier.
The next quest would be the search for a contract between the purchaser and
the remote supplier. As a practical matter such a contract will rarely be found.
However, if found, a suit for breach of warranty would follow the same pattern
as an identical suit against the immediate vendor.
In the absence of a contract between the remote vendor and the ultimate con-
sumer, the remote vendor may only be sued in trespass. A duty is found imposed
upon manufacturers, in the law, to the extent that remote suppliers of food and
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drugs impliedly warrant to the consumer that they are fit for the purpose for
which intended, and unless the producer can prove that he was not negligent in
producing such products he will be liable to persons injured as a result of dele-
terious substances contained in the food; remote suppliers of other chattels which
will become dangerous if negligently produced are liable to persons injured thereby
unless they can prove that they were not negligent in producing such chattels. This
assumes that the doctrine of exclusive control has been invoked, shifting the burden
of proof to the defendant.
Finally, it must be remembered that if the action is prosecuted in the wrong
form, the defendant waives his right to object after there has been a trial on the
merits, in the absence of an injurious effect upon the trial. However, if the de-
fendant objects in the pleading stage, the wrong form of action will be fatal,
unless there is an amendment of the pleading. 47
William L. Otten.
47 See Caveat Venditor by Charles L. Casper, 52 D. L. R. 135, for a complete discussion of
the liability of vendors of food in Pennsylvania.
